Could These Tactical Tweaks Save Michael Carrick’s Job? | Analysis

Written By Craig Simpkin | Published at October 22, 2026
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Manchester, England - 17.08.2025: Red Manchester United flag with club crest blows in the wind near Old Trafford stadium.

Michael Carrick took to the head coach’s position at Manchester United like a duck to water last season.

A run of form reading W13 D7 L4 as the interim manager at Old Trafford was enough for the club’s board to give the former Middlesbrough head coach the job permanently.

But, as there’s already been countless examples of over the years, the switch from caretaker to permanent boss rarely goes without a hitch.

The Red Devils have won just one of their opening seven Premier League games in 2026/27, while their Champions League campaign has started to unravel in the face of resounding defeats against Atletico Madrid and now Como.

On the face of it, not a long has changed tactically. However, question marks over a lack of new defensive recruits in the summer, as well as a lack of balance in midfield, has seen opponents cut through United’s middle like a hot knife through cold butter.

So what can Carrick change in order to save their season… and his own job?

Finding the Right Balance in Midfield

Carrick has kissed a few metaphorical frogs in his pursuit of finding a princely balance in midfield.

The trio of Bruno Fernandes, Kobbie Mainoo and Youri Tielemans hasn’t quite worked. There’s no shortage of talent and energy there, but a lack of defensive nous and positioning has occasionally left United’s defence exposed – particularly on the counter attack.

And so Carrick went rogue against Como, fielding Andrey Santos and Mason Mount as something of a double pivot while Tielemans was given the freedom to roam and get forward.

But it didn’t work. Time and again Como found pockets of space in between United’s midfield and backline, with their second goal coming directly from Nico Paz being afforded acres of room in the middle of the pitch between the lines.

Every time Carrick attempts to solve one problem, he seems to create another; in this case, fielding that midfield trio left his side bereft in key areas and also forced Fernandes to take up positions on the left-hand side, where he and Matheus Cunha got in each other’s way – rather than forming a formidable partnership.

Believe In Baleba

Perhaps Carlos Baleba is key. The summer recruit from Brighton hasn’t played much as he recovers from an ankle ligament injury, but he is more of the defensive shield that United have been crying out for.

Carrick can then build around Baleba, adding in Mainoo against stronger opposition or affording Fernandes and Tielemans the opportunity to flow and express themselves against weaker sides.

Of course, another solution may be to drop Fernandes altogether. The Portuguese has not been at his best this term, while his acerbic comments following the Como defeat offer Carrick the perfect excuse to drop his talisman to the bench…

Zonal or Man-to-Man Press?

There are pros and cons to pressing the opposition in a structured zonal shape, or in allowing your players to track their opposite number in man-to-man fashion.

Whichever option you choose – the best coaches, the ones that are able to organise their players diligently and get their messages across, are able to adopt a hybrid system too, you have to have the buy-in of your players. The press has to suit their profiles as individuals and a collective unit.

Do United have that? The eye test suggests not, while even those within the camp have been scathing of Carrick’s lack of direction when it comes to United’s out-of-possession shape and behaviours.

Speaking Out

That chastening defeat to Como was the last straw for Fernandes, who – no doubt emboldened by Lisandro Martinez speaking out against the club’s board following their loss in Madrid – gave his manager both barrels in his post-match interview.

“It's a decision from the staff to not press man-to-man and sometimes leave a little space in behind and try to get the ball in the first moment, to wait for them, to give them the ball,” the Portuguese ace commented.

“But sometimes when you give too much the ball to these teams they get confident, they have so many bodies behind the ball that make you run a lot, make people get frustrated, and then obviously when you recover the ball the legs are, and the brain, much more difficult to make it work.”

Unfortunately, when trapped in the middle of the relentless Premier League-Champions League fixture cycle, there is little time on the training ground to iron out these tactical kinks.

But Carrick will have to make time: clarity in United’s pressing and out-of-possession shape – do we want to be aggressive or do we want to sit in? – rather than a half-and-half approach will surely add some defensive stability to his side.

Plan B In Attack

Tactically speaking, there’s not a great deal wrong with Manchester United’s attacking play… up to a point, at least.

In the Premier League this term, they have occupied their opposition’s third of the pitch for 34% of game time – no other team in the division, not even Arsenal or Man City, can match that territorial advantage.

The Red Devils also rank fourth in the standings for ‘touches in the opposition’s box’, so clearly they are capable of effectively advancing the ball through the thirds and finding a route into dangerous areas.

But then… well, not a lot happens.

United have scored ten goals in seven games so far from an xG of 11.6, so while they are good at getting into final third positions, they just aren’t that great at creating big chances and then putting them in the back of the net.

Some of these data metrics that United perform well in could actually be seen as a deficiency in their play. Yes, they recycle possession efficiently, but…

Chelsea, in contrast, rank just eleventh for time spent in their opposition’s third, but they’ve scored 17 times. Man City, ranking tenth for the same metric, also top the xG created standings.

Having the ball in the final third doesn’t count for much if you do precious little with it, so perhaps a tactical tweak is needed from Carrick to make his side more dangerous in and around the opposition’s penalty area.

Is Sesko the Solution?

Could Benjamin Sesko be the answer? The Slovenian, standing 6ft 4in, won’t win any awards for subtlety, but he does offer a useful Plan B for United – if you can’t play through or around your opponents, play over them instead.

Sesko scored eleven Premier League goals in just 1,639 minutes of play last season, so he is more than capable of finding the net with regularity.

Unfortunately, he continues to be plagued by injuries, so he may not provide an immediate solution, but his style of play provides the Red Devils with a different way to attack – they can play in wide areas and sling crosses into the box, which may reduce the amount of time they spend in their opposition’s third of the pitch… but could enhance their productivity all the same.

United’s False Nine

In the absence of Sesko, and recognising the need to have more bodies playing behind – rather than in front of – the ball, Carrick has opted for the ‘square peg in a round hole’ solution of fielding Fernandes as a ‘false nine’ striker.

The 32-year-old broke the all-time Premier League record for most assists in a single season last term. Yes, some of those came via his outstanding set piece delivery, but for the most part Fernandes created goals with the ball at his feet and with the play in front of him.

As a false nine, you’re taking away his greatest strength by asking him to play with his back to goal; acting as the first receiver when United break out of their defensive shape.

There’s an idea here: Fernandes receives the ball, controls it and then plays in one of the wide men – be it Mbeumo, Cunha or Amad Diallo – in behind.

Solve One Problem, Create Another

It’s a tactical philosophy born out of the desire for bodies behind the ball, before either breaking at pace in wide areas or controlling possession, in a slow tempo fashion, as midfield players jump out to support.

But the problem with the counter-attack is that if you commit too many bodies forward, you leave wide-open spaces for the opponent to exploit if they are able to turn over the ball.

Crucially, it’s a style that simply does not get the best out of Fernandes. And his performances in the role against Leeds and Como – he was substituted off after an hour in the latter – are indicative of that.

Tactically, this is a viable solution to United’s defensive woes. In theory, anyway. But by ceding possession to your opponent and allowing them to play – the ‘half press’, as Fernandes termed it – you will eventually get picked off at the highest level.

In barely solving one problem, Carrick has created more. It’s a sure sign of a head coach fighting fires… and perhaps a suggestion of one running out of ideas, too.